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Abstract: Article 56 of the European Convention on Human Rights is often re-
ferred to as the «colonial clause» and it has received little attention by commen-
tators, whereas there has been extensive writing on Article 1of the Convention 
regarding the extraterritorial reach of that treaty. Article 56 has nevertheless 
the effect of limiting the responsibility of Member States for acts and omissions 
of the authorities of its dependent territories, although the Member State is still 
responsible if it acts directly through its own metropolitan officials in such ter-
ritories. By employing an example of Norway, this paper finds it unnecessary 
for this country to undertake obligations pursuant to Article 56 in relation to 
its dependent territories in and around Antarctica, since there is currently litt-
le activity there which is not already covered by the extraterritorial regime of 
Article 1 of the Convention. The paper additionally considers the pros and cons 
of extending the Convention to territories under Article 56 should future devel-
opments lead to a larger and more permanent population of these areas.
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1. Introduction
Two important judgments from the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) 
regarding the use of military forces abroad were delivered in the summer of 2011.2 
In the Al-Skeini judgment, the Court also upheld its former jurisprudence on a 
more peripheral issue; the relationship of Articles 1 and 56 of the 1950 Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, often referred to 
as the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention).3
Hence, responsibility may be incurred by a Member State under both provi-
sions, and although territories possibly covered by declarations under Article 56 
may be found all over the world, a number of such territories are located in the 
area covered by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; south of 60° S latitude.4 This article 
will primarily consider these areas. A central issue here is whether jurisdiction 
under Article 1 may bring territory which could have been covered by a declaration 
under Article 56 within the jurisdiction of the Court, even where no declaration 
has been made by the relevant Member State.5
In the following, the issues of jurisdiction under Article 1 and specialized ter-
ritories under Article 56 will be addressed, before the relationship between these 
two provisions is analyzed.
2. Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, Judgment (Grand 
Chamber) and Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27021/08, 7 July 2011, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber). Both cases refer to the activities of British troops in Iraq.
3. CETS No. 005. Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, 
Judgment (Grand Chamber), § 140. Art. 56 numbered before Protocol 11 as Art. 63, and slight 
changes were made by this protocol to the wording of the article. For the sake of convenience, 
however, the paper will only refer to the provision as Art. 56 unless it is necessary for the sake 
of clarity to refer to former Article 63.
4. 402 UNTS 71. Under Art. VI «[t]he provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area 
south of 60° South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall 
prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under in-
ternational law with regard to the high seas within that area.»
5. Clauses similar to Art. 56 are found in Protocols 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, but these clauses will 
not be discussed further in this article. However, it should be noted that in Protocol 6 and 
onwards, there is no longer any reference to these territories having to be territories for whose 
international relations a Member State is responsible.
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2. Jurisdiction following Article 1
As both of the abovementioned provisions may establish responsibility for ac-
tivities undertaken outside a State’s metropolitan area, it makes sense to consider 
when responsibility may arise under each one of them. Article 1 thus offers a valu-
able alternative if no declaration has been made under Article 56.
Article 1 provides that «[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to every-
one within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention.»6 The key term is thus jurisdiction and it has been discussed in numer-
ous academic articles and monographs since especially the Court’s 2001 Banković 
decision.7
The Court’s approach to this issue has been rather ad hoc, establishing on a 
case-by-case basis exceptions to an application otherwise limited merely to the ter-
ritory of a Member State.8 Broadly speaking, beyond the national territory of the 
Member State, jurisdiction may also exist where the Member State holds authority 
and control over an individual, or exercises effective control over an area.9 There 
is no need for the geographical place where the alleged violation takes place to 
have any historical connection to the said Member State, or even to be located in 
a territorial entity recognized by that Member State as a State. The violation may 
therefore take place anywhere in the world.
6. Provisions are found in the protocols to the Convention which extend the reach of Art. 1 to 
also cover the provisions of those protocols, e.g. Protocol 1 Art. 5.
7. Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, Appl. No. 52207/99, 12 December 2001, Decision 
as to the admissibility (Grand Chamber). The case concerned the potential responsibility for 
among other things deaths following an air attack by NATO in 1999 on a target in Beograd.
8. Moor, Louise and AW Brian Simpson, «Ghosts of Colonialism in the European Convention 
on Human Rights», British Year Book of International Law, (76) 2005 pp. 121–93, p. 125. See 
also the concurring opinion of Bonello in Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 
No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, Judgment (Grand Chamber).
9. Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, Judgment (Grand 
Chamber), §§ 133–40.
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As regards the effective control alternative, jurisdiction arises when a Member 
State assumes such control over foreign territory, either through its own troops 
or through a local administration which is under the control of the said State.10 
It makes no difference here whether that control is of a semi-permanent or tem-
porary nature.11
The Court’s jurisprudence in relation to vessels is also illustrative. Accordingly, 
the Convention applies when command over a vessel is assumed by naval forces 
of a Member State and the vessel is thereafter forcefully escorted to one of its 
harbors,12 when persons are taken on board a Member State’s naval vessel during 
rescue operations on the high sea,13 when a vessel is hindered from entering the 
territorial waters of a Member State by the naval forces of that state,14 and when a 
naval vessel of a Member State, upon consent from a flag state to control vessels 
flying its flag, navigates outside the territorial waters of the Member State in such 
a way that damage is inflicted upon another vessel belonging to the said flag state 
with resulting loss of life.15
10. Loizidou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89, 18 December 1996, Judgment (Grand Chamber), § 52 
and Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001, Judgment (Grand Chamber), §§ 77–
80. This case concerned the right of displaced persons from Northern Cyprus to return to 
their former homes and properties.
11. Issa and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, 16 November 2004, Judgment, § 74. Here, 
Turkey’s extraterritorial military operation lasted 6 weeks, but jurisdiction was not found to 
exist after an evaluation of the facts of the case. The case concerned potential responsibility 
for the detention and killing of Iraqi citizens.
12. Rigopoulos v. Spain, Appl. No. 37388/97, 12 January 1999, Decision as to the admissibility, and 
Medvedyev and Others v. France, Appl. No. 3394/03, 29 March 2010, Judgment (Grand Chamber).
13. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Appl. No. 27765/09, 23 February 2012, Judgment (Grand 
Chamber).
14. Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, Appl. 31276/05, 3 February 2009, Judgment. See 
Geiβ, Robin and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2011 pp. 110–1.
15. Xhavare et al. v. Italy and Albania, Appl. No. 39473/98, 11 January 2001, Decision as to the 
admissibility. See Geiβ and Petrig 2011 p. 114.
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These days the main issue in relation to Article 1 would seem to be the extent 
to which responsibility of a Member State may be replaced by that of another State 
or organization which is not a party to the Convention16– an issue introduced by 
the Court in its landmark Behrami and Saramati decision.17
3. The territories of Article 56
3.1 Which territories may be covered by declarations under 
Article 56?
The obligations of a treaty are applicable even to non-metropolitan territories for 
whose international relations a State is responsible, unless a different intention 
appears from the treaty or is otherwise established.18 Moreover, the term jurisdic-
tion itself does not limit the Convention to only apply to the territory of a Member 
State.19 However, the abovementioned ‘different intention’ and corresponding limi-
16. See e.g. Stein, Torsten, «Kosovo and the International Community. The Attribution of 
Possible Internationally Wrongful Acts: Responsibility of NATO or of its Member States?», 
in Tomuschat, Christian (ed.) Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002 pp. 181–92; Larsen, Kjetil Mujezinovic, «Attribution 
of Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and Control’ Test», European Journal 
of International Law, (19) 2008 pp. 509–31; Van der Toorn, Damien, «Attribution of Conduct 
by State Armed Forces Participating in UN-authorised Operations: The Impact of Behrami 
and Al-Jedda» Australian International Law Journal, (15) 2008 pp. 9–27; Bell, Caitlin A., 
«Reassessing Multiple Attribution: The International Law Commission and the Behrami and 
Saramati Decision», New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (42) 2009–
10 pp. 501–48; Geiβ and Petrig 2011 pp. 116–30; and Frostad, Magne, «The Responsibility of 
Sending States for Human Rights Violations during Peace Support Operations and the Issue 
of Detention», Military Law and Law of War Review, (50) 2011 pp. 127–188. This is not merely a 
question of who is responsible for an established breach of human rights, but might also show 
that there was no breach of any substantive human rights rule should e.g. an international 
governmental organization be found responsible. This since such an organization is probably 
a non-party to the relevant treaty, might not have human rights obligations following from 
its own constitutive instrument, and since there might be a lack of relevant customary inter-
national law obligations binding on that subject of international law.
17. Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, Appl. Nos. 
71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007, Decision as to the admissibility (Grand Chamber). These 
cases relate to acts and omissions of the UN-mandated and NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
which resulted in death and injury of children having played with non-detonated ammuni-
tions, and the arbitrary detention of a suspect, respectively.
18. 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 29.
19. Jacobs, Francis G., The European Convention on Human Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975 
pp. 11 and 14–5.
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tation on the reach of Article 1 is found in Article 56 which provides a lex specialis 
regulation for the type of territory covered by that provision.20 No similar regula-
tion would seem to exist in the main United Nations’ conventions on human rights 
or in the other regional human rights conventions.21
When the Convention was negotiated, a number of potential Member States 
held colonial territories and among these the United Kingdom strongly argued 
for the Convention not applying automatically to such geographical areas – a 
view supported to a large extent by the travaux préparatoires.22 This led to former 
Article 63 which now constitutes Article 56 of the Convention and which is often 
referred to as the ‘colonial clause.’ Paragraph 1 of Article 56 thus provides that 
«[a]ny State may at the time of its ratification or at any time thereafter declare by 
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that the 
present Convention shall, subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or 
any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible.» Thus, the 
Member State may choose whether none, some, or all of its relevant territories 
should enjoy the benefits of such a declaration.
It has been pointed out that this power to extend the protection of the 
Convention also constitutes by default the power to withhold it,23 and the former 
European Commission of Human Rights (Commission) held in relation to the 
purpose of this provision, that Article 56 is «not only the territorial extension of 
the Convention but its adaptation to the measure of self-government attained in 
particular non-metropolitan territories and to the cultural and social differences 
in such territories».24 Obviously, this provision cannot limit the responsibility for 
other Member States than the said metropolitan State under the ordinary regime 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction in Article 1.
The key term is thus ‘territories for whose international relations [the Member 
State] is responsible.’ It would seem as if the travaux préparatoires largely reserved 
20. For the view that without this provision, the Convention would presumably have applied 
to territories covered by Art. 56 as well, see Jacobs, Francis G., The European Convention 
on Human Rights p. 14, and White, Robin C.A. and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey The 
European Convention on Human Rights, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010 p. 98.
21. An exception here is the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277, Art. 12. See Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 137, n. 89.
22. On the travaux préparatoires of Article 56, see Vasak, Karel, «The European Convention of 
Human Rights beyond the Frontiers of Europe», The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, (12) 1963 pp. 1206–1231, and Moor and Simpson 2005 pp. 132–50.
23. Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 121.
24. Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 25 May 1975, Decision as to the admis-
sibility, § 9 in relation to Art. 63.
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this category for non-European entities,25 but the non-opposition by other Member 
States to the practice of the United Kingdom in extending (or withholding) the 
protection of the Convention to dependencies like Jersey and the Isle of Man, has 
led to the category also including European dependencies.26
The Commission moreover observed in the Belgian Congo case that this term
has succeeded other, more restrictive terms employed such as ‘colonies’, or ‘non-
metropolitan areas’; whereas this change represents an effort to facilitate, although 
without rendering compulsory, the application of the more important international 
treaties to territories the status of which is as varied as it is interchangeable but with-
out assigning a final degree of importance to any one such status.27
Miltner is nevertheless correct in pointing out that the Commission «failed to 
clarify what characteristics such ‘territories’ might have, or how they might be 
identified.»28
Whether an area may be covered by a declaration under Article 56 or should 
instead be considered as part of the metropolitan territory of a Member State de-
pends on the domestic legislation of the relevant State.29 Hence, the metropolitan 
territory may cover a rather diverse set of territories and this is shown inter alia by 
the incorporation of the Jan Mayen Island and Svalbard into Norway, the Åland 
Islands into Finland, Rockall into the United Kingdom, Madeira and the Azores 
into Portugal, and the Canary Islands and the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on 
the Moroccan coast into Spain. In theory, this wide freedom of choice may help 
to circumvent the protection intended to follow from the Convention.
The United Kingdom is among the few States having applied this provision, 
and the Convention is therefore applicable to Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, the Bailiwick of Guernsey, 
25. Tomuchat, Christian, «Turkey’s Declaration under Article 25 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights», in Nowak, Manfred, Steurer, Dorothea and Tretter, Hannes (eds.), Progress in 
the Spirit of Human Rights: Festschrift für Felix Ermacora, N.P. Engel Verlag, Kehl am Rhein 
1988 pp. 109–39, p. 128. However, an alternative but rejected version of the colonial clause 
included the term «overseas territories», see Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 145.
26. Tomuchat 1988 pp. 128–9.
27. X and Others v. Belgium, Appl. No. 1065/61, 30 May 1961, Decision as to the admissibility 
(Commission), Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, (4) 1961 pp. 260–70, 
p. 266.
28. Miltner, Barbara L., «Revisiting Extraterritoriality: the ECHR and its Lessons», ExpressO, 
2011 p. 22 at: http://works.bepress.com/barbara_miltner/1 (last visited September 6, 2012).
29. Harris, David J., Michael O’Boyle, Ed P. Bates and Carla M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2009 p. 807.
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Isle of Man, the Bailiwick of Jersey, Montserrat, St Helena, Ascension and Tristan 
da Cunha, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Sovereign Base Areas of 
Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.30 Formerly the 
United Kingdom’s declarations covered many additional territories, but these have 
later largely obtained independence.31 Similar declarations have also been issued 
by Denmark,32 the Netherlands,33 Germany34 and France35 in relation to some or 
all of their respective dependencies.
The Commission first applied this provision in the above mentioned Belgian 
Congo case, where it found the case inadmissible since no relevant declaration had 
been made by Belgium.36 Although the applicants held that a declaration under 
Article 56 was unnecessary since the relevant territory constituted an integral part 
of Belgium, the Commission nevertheless held it to be manifest that the territory 
fell into the Article 56 category.37Thus, Moor and Simpson correctly hold that 
«the territory in question was, in common sense, a clear example of an overseas 
colonial territory.»38
30. See http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=
8&DF=17/03/2012&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last visited September 6, 2012).
31. For an overview of the wide geographical application which the Convention gained through 
U.K. declarations, see Vasak 1963 pp. 1210–11.
32. In 1953 in relation to Greenland. See Vasak 1963 p. 1210.
33. In 1955 and 1985 for Surinam, Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. See Lush, Christopher, «The 
Territorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Recent Case Law», The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (42)(4) 1993 pp. 897–906, p. 902 with further 
references.
34. In 1952 the old Federal Republic of Germany resumed responsibility for West-Berlin. See 
Lush 1993 p. 902 with further references.
35. Its 1974 declaration covers a number of its overseas territories (territories d’outre-mer), where-
as some of its overseas territories are treated the same as metropolitan France (départements 
d’outre-mer). See Lush 1993 p. 902 with further references, and Harris, O’Boyle, Bates and 
Buckley 2009 p. 807.
36. X and Others v. Belgium, Appl. No. 1065/61, 30 May 1961, Decision as to the admissibility 
(Commission), Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, (4) 1961 pp. 260–70, 
p. 266–8. It would seem as if the Belgian Congo was treated by domestic Belgian law as part 
of Belgium, but at the same time the Belgian declaration upon ratification assumed that a 
declaration would be necessary for the application of the Convention to this territory, see 
Moor and Simpson 2005 pp. 165 and 166–9, and X and Others v. Belgium, Appl. No. 1065/61, 
30 May 1961, ibid., p. 266.
37. X and Others v. Belgium, Appl. No. 1065/61, 30 May 1961, ibid.
38. Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 169.
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3.2 Due regard to local requirements
The Court had its first encounter with this provision in the Tyrer case39 regard-
ing corporal punishment on the Isle of Man – a territory not part of the United 
Kingdom but instead a dependency of the Crown with its own government, legis-
lature and courts, and its own administrative, fiscal and legal systems.40 Here, the 
issue was whether Article 56 paragraph 3 could help the United Kingdom to escape 
responsibility, as that paragraph states that «[t]he provisions of this Convention 
shall be applied in such territories with due regard, however, to local require-
ments.» The Court nevertheless found that there were no relevant local require-
ments which could have limited the responsibility of the United Kingdom in that 
case, as the United Kingdom only referred to public opinion and did not offer 
positive and conclusive proof of a requirement for upholding the right to birch 
juvenile offenders.41 Moreover, had the United Kingdom provided proof of such a 
requirement, the Court would nevertheless have refused to accept it as overriding 
the protection offered by Article 3.42
A similar issue was raised in Piermont in relation to some of the French overseas 
territories where the Court simply noted that
the arguments put forward by the Government relate essentially to the tense local 
political atmosphere taken together with an election campaign and therefore em-
phasise circumstances and conditions more than requirements. A political situation, 
admittedly a sensitive one but also one which could occur in the mother country, 
does not suffice in order to interpret the phrase «local requirements» as justifying 
an interference with the right secured in Article 10 (art. 10).43
The only case where the due regard notion has so far been upheld as a valid limi-
tation on a right or freedom also relates to France – the Py case.44 Here the Court 
focused on the turbulent political and institutional history of New Caledonia and 
found the relevant limitation to have been «instrumental in alleviating the bloody 
conflict».45
39. Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 25 April 1978, Judgment.
40. Ibid., § 13.
41. Ibid., § 38.
42. Ibid., § 13.
43. Piermont v. France, Appl. Nos. 15773/89 and 15774/89, 27 April 1995, Judgment,  §  59. 
Admittedly, France never made an explicit declaration on the application of the Convention 
to its dependencies, but its declaration upon ratification should be understood as an implied 
declaration sufficient for such purposes. See Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 176.
44. Py v. France, Appl. No. 66289/01, 11 January 2005, Judgment.
45. Ibid., §§ 62–4.
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It would thus seem that the fears held by Vasak regarding the due regard clause 
have not come to fruition:
This idea is one which leaves too much freedom to the executive organ responsible 
for its application and too much responsibility of a political nature to the judge. Fears 
were also expressed in the Consultative Assembly that the words «local require-
ments» might be understood as covering «political requirements».46
3.3 The individual right to petition
In contrast to the metropolitan territories of a Member State and its ‘ordinary’ 
presence abroad, where persons who are within the jurisdiction of that Member 
State now automatically hold the right to file individual applications,47 the right 
to individual application in territories covered by a declaration under Article 56 
requires a separate declaration under paragraph 4 of that provision.
However, it would seem as if most territories covered by declarations under 
Article 56 paragraph 1 are now similarly covered by declarations under Article 56 
paragraph 4. The latter declarations tend even to permanently recognize the right 
to individual petitions under Article 34.
3.4 When do Article 56 declarations cease to apply?
Article 56 does not explicitly regulate the possibility of a Member State terminat-
ing a declaration under that provision, but this possibility follows from Article 58 
paragraph 4. Moreover, the House of Lords has concluded that territory covered by 
a declaration may lose its protection under such a declaration if the said territory 
is transformed into a new but dependent territory (per Lord Hoffman):
In 1953 the United Kingdom made a declaration under article 56 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights extending the application of the Convention to 
Mauritius as one of the «territories for whose international relations it is responsible». 
That declaration lapsed when Mauritius became independent. No such declaration 
has ever been made in respect of [the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)]. It is 
true that the territory of BIOT was, until the creation of the colony in 1965, part of 
Mauritius. But a declaration, as appears from the words «for whose international 
46. Vasak 1963 p. 1209 with further references.
47. This right was made obligatory as late as 1998 with Protocol 11. Both legal and natural persons 
may be considered as victims under Art. 34. See Harris, O’Boyle, Bates and Buckley 2009 pp. 
790–800, and White and Ovey 2010 pp. 30–3. In addition to individual applications, Member 
States may also bring inter-state cases under Art. 33. This has only been done to a very lim-
ited degree, although the incidents are more frequent here than under the UN human rights 
instruments or other regional human rights instruments.
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relations it is responsible» applies to a political entity and not to the land which is 
from time to time comprised in its territory. BIOT has since 1965 been a new politi-
cal entity to which the Convention has never been extended.48
When territories covered by Article 56 declarations are released into indepen-
dence, they are – in contrast to the normal understanding of a State’s human rights 
obligations after secessions49 – typically seen as released from their obligations un-
der the Convention. This since the new State may not be entitled to membership in 
the Council of Europe which is a requirement for being a party to the Convention.50 
However, if the new State is located within the expanded geographical notion of 
Europe applied by the Council of Europe, like some of the British dependencies, 
there is a stronger case for its obligations under the Convention following it into 
independence. Furthermore, after such territories have become independent, indi-
vidual applications cannot be brought against the Member State formerly respon-
sible for the international relations of the territory for ‘breaches’ occurring after 
that date, as the declaration of individual application automatically lapses when 
independence is granted.51 However, responsibility may then exist under the no-
tion of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the acts or omissions of that Member State.
Another way through which a declaration may be terminated was seen in 
1953 when Greenland was redefined into a part of metropolitan Denmark only 
two months after Denmark had made a declaration under Article 56.52 Although 
Greenland has lately been given a large degree of autonomy within the Kingdom of 
48. R (on the application of Bancoult) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (Appellant) [2008] UKHL 61, (22 October 2008), § 64. The case is 
currently before the Court as Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35622/04, 
lodged on September 20, 2004.
49. Cassese, Antonio, International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005 pp. 78–9.
50. Jacobs 1975 p. 15. This follows from Convention Art. 58 § 3 and Art. 59 § 1, and 1949 Statute 
of the Council of Europe, CETS No. 001, Art. 4 («Any European State…»). An interesting ini-
tiative in relation to this is mentioned by Vasak: «These newly independent States are unable, 
as we have seen, to renew the declaration of extension made on their account by the United 
Kingdom, since they are not members of the Council of Europe. Should they be given that pos-
sibility by «untying» the Convention from the Council of Europe? The Consultative Assembly 
thought so and adopted a recommendation to the effect that, in certain circumstances, States 
not Members of the Council of Europe (European or non-European) be allowed to adhere to 
the Convention. But the Committee of Ministers decided [in 1963] not to act on this recom-
mendation»; Vasak 1963 pp. 1214–5.
51. X v. the Netherlands, Appl. No. 7230/75, 4 October 1976, Decision as to the admissibility, § 1. 
See Jacobs 1975 p. 15, and White and Ovey 2009 p. 98.
52. As mentioned by Jacobs 1975 p. 15, and White and Ovey 2009 p. 90.
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Denmark,53 it has not declared itself independent. Admittedly, the territory might 
have much in common with territories covered by Article 56 declarations, but it 
does not seem as if Denmark has notified the Council of Europe of any redefinition 
of Greenland into such a territory. As Denmark therefore seems to stand by her 
obligations under the Convention in relation to Greenland,54 the Court remains 
available for cases regarding that territory.
4. The relationship of Article 1 and Article 56
4.1 General aspects
Article 56 has been held by Happold as «a colonial relic with no implications for the 
interpretation of other provisions of the Convention».55 The relevant Convention or-
gans have nevertheless upheld its existence and distinguished it from the regime of 
extraterritorial application developed under Article 1.56 Thus, both provisions remain 
applicable in such a way that none of them may be interpreted away by the other one.
In addressing the relationship between these provisions, the Commission ac-
cordingly stated in its decision from 1975 on the admissibility of the Cyprus v. 
Turkey case, that Article 56 cannot be interpreted in such a way that it limits the 
scope of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in Article 1 to metropolitan territories.57 Turning 
the table around and looking at Article 56 through the prisms of Article 1, appli-
cants have also sought to apply the ever-developing notion of jurisdiction to ter-
53. Law No. 473 from 12 June 2009 regarding Greenland Self-Government («Lov om Grønlands 
Selvstyre»), https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=125052 (last visited 
September 6, 2012).
54. See also Commentary to Draft Act regarding Greenland Self-Government, presented February 
5,2009, p. 31–4 and p. 55–6: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=123055 
(last visited September 6, 2012), and Guidelines No. 58 from July 2, 2012 regarding the 
handling of issues of relevance to Greenland, para. 4.3 («Vejledning om minesteriers be-
handling af sager vedrørende Grønland»), https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.
aspx?id=142582&exp=1 (last visited September 6, 2012).
55. Happold, Matthew, «Bankovic v Belgium and the Territorial Scope of the European 
Convention on Human Rights», Human Rights Law Review, (3) 2003 pp. 77–90, p. 88. Moor 
and Simpson 2005 p. 186 likewise consider the provision anachronistic.
56. See, e.g. Loizidou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89, 23 March 1995, Decision as to the admissibil-
ity, §§ 86–8, Quark Fishing v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 15305/06, 19 September 2006, 
Decision as to the admissibility, p. 4, and Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 
No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, Judgment (Grand Chamber), § 140.
57. Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 25 May 1975, Decision as to the admis-
sibility, § 9. Upheld later in e.g. Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 48787/99, 
4 July 2001, Decision as to the admissibility, p. 20.
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ritories which could have been covered by a declaration but where no such declara-
tion exists. The Commission dealt with this issue in the Bui Van Than case where 
the applicants claimed that «the acts of the Hong Kong authorities are based on 
United Kingdom policy with the consequence that the matters complained of by 
the applicants fall within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for purposes of 
Article 1 of the Convention.»58 The Commission essentially held that no jurisdic-
tion could arise in relation to such territories unless a declaration under Article 
56 had been made, and stated that
[i]t is an essential part of the scheme of Article [56] that a declaration extending the 
Convention to such a territory be made before the Convention applies either to acts 
of the dependent Government or to policies formulated by the Government of a 
Contracting Party in the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to such territory. 
Accordingly, in the present case even if the Commission were to accept that the acts 
of the Hong Kong authorities were based on United Kingdom policy, it must find that 
it has no competence to examine the application since no declaration under Article 
[56] para. 1 has been made in respect of Hong Kong.59
Although it has been held that the Commission did not seriously address the issue 
of where the violations occurred – in the United Kingdom or in Hong Kong60 – 
the decision does at least provide some predictability for the authorities as to the 
reach of their responsibility. The Commission’s view was later upheld by the Court 
in the Yonghong case regarding the acts of the Portuguese Governor of Macau.61 
Here, Moor and Simpson are admittedly correct in observing that
[t]he Court did not address the question whether Macao was at this time a territory 
for whose international relations Portugal was responsible, so that the Convention 
was capable of extension to it; if it was not, and this was the position under the agree-
ment [between China and Portugal on the gradual return of Macau to China], the 
outcome was that a territory under the [mere] administrative control of Portugal 
neither enjoyed, nor could enjoy, human rights protection under the Convention. So 
Macao was a black hole so far as Convention protection was concerned.62
58. Bui Van Than and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 16137/90, 12 March 1990, Commission 
decision as to the admissibility, Vol. 65 European Commission of Human Rights Decisions 
July 1990 (1993), pp. 330–3, p. 332.
59. Ibid., p. 333. A somewhat similar argument – focusing on extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
Art. 1 – is nevertheless pursued in Farran, Sue, «The Case of Pitcairn: A Small Island, Many 
Questions», Journal of South Pacific Law, (11)(2) 2007 pp. 124–50, pp. 128–9 and 149.
60. Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 170.
61. Yonghong v. Portugal, Appl. No. 50887/99, 25 November 1999, Decision as to the admissibility 
(English translation).
62. Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 171.
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However, it is only to be expected that the Court will avoid considering issues 
which may be bypassed in the handling of the case before it; why establish whether 
Portugal could extend the relevant protection under Article 56 if she never actu-
ally did so?
In the Quark case, the Court continued to consider Article 56 as different from 
the expanding notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1,63 and the 
Court’s latest comment on Article 56 is found in the Al-Skeini case. It is of such 
brevity that it may be quoted in extenso:
The «effective control» principle of jurisdiction set out above does not replace the sys-
tem of declarations under Article 56 of the Convention (formerly Article 63) which 
the States decided, when drafting the Convention, to apply to territories overseas for 
whose international relations they were responsible. Article 56 § 1 provides a mecha-
nism whereby any State may decide to extend the application of the Convention, 
«with due regard.… to local requirements,» to all or any of the territories for whose 
international relations it is responsible. The existence of this mechanism, which was 
included in the Convention for historical reasons, cannot be interpreted in present 
conditions as limiting the scope of the term «jurisdiction» in Article 1. The situa-
tions covered by the «effective control» principle are clearly separate and distinct 
from circumstances where a Contracting State has not, through a declaration under 
Article 56, extended the Convention or any of its Protocols to an overseas territory 
for whose international relations it is responsible (see Loizidou (preliminary objec-
tions), cited above, §§ 86–89 and Quark Fishing Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 
no. 15305/06, ECHR 2006[…]).64
Here the Court seemingly limits the application of Article 56 to overseas territo-
ries, or at least indicates that this was the intention of the drafters. Be that as it 
may, the quote does not explicitly limit the application of Article 56 to only such 
territories. The British tradition of extending the Convention through the use of 
this provision to e.g. the Isle of Man is moreover far too well known and accepted 
for the Court to reverse its jurisprudence without a far more elaborate discussion 
of the matter.
Accordingly, the notion of jurisdiction under Article 1 cannot be limited by the 
regime under Article 56, which on the other hand constitutes the exclusive regime 
for establishing ‘ordinary’ jurisdiction over territories for whose international re-
lations the State Party is responsible. However, the exclusivity of Article 56 only 
63. Quark Fishing Ltd v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 15305/06, 19 September 2006, Decision 
as to the admissibility.
64. Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, Judgment (Grand 
Chamber), § 140. Italics by author.
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refers to responsibility for the acts of the local administration and the policies 
decided by the State Party itself in relation to that territory.65 This is hinted at in 
Loizidou where the Court stated that
Article [56]…concerns a decision by a Contracting Party to assume full responsibil-
ity under the Convention for all acts of public authorities in respect of a territory for 
whose international relations it is responsible. Article [34]…, on the other hand, con-
cerns an acceptance by a Contracting Party of the competence of the Commission 
to examine complaints relating to the acts of its own officials acting under its direct 
authority.66
Moor and Simpson state in relation to the term ‘all acts’ in the above quote that 
«there still might be responsibility for particular acts under Article 1, for example 
acts specifically authorized, even without a declaration.»67 It is nevertheless just as 
plausible for the reference to merely point out that responsibility under Article 56 
could then arise for all acts, as opposed to none. As regards the reference to ‘own 
officials’ in the quote above, Moor and Simpson correctly hold that a Member State 
would also incur responsibility for the acts of its own personnel when they act in 
territories not covered by a declaration under Article 56.68 In the latter case, any 
consideration of responsibility for the said Member State would have to be assessed 
in relation to Article 1. This typically requires the person to have fallen under the 
authority and control of these officials, or that he finds himself in territory admin-
istered in a manner similar to those incidents which have established responsibility 
under the effective (overall) control notion, like e.g. the Turkish influence on the af-
fairs of Northern Cyprus. As the Court still upholds the separate identity of Article 
56, the said control over a territory would have to be different from that which is 
normally the case in territories which may be covered by Article 56. This would 
probably require something close to an occupational authority, and is probably sel-
dom at hand beyond instances where the territory has tried to gain independence, 
but where these efforts have been kept in check by a metropolitan military presence.
Hence, the real question is what constitutes the said local administration. If 
the Member State holds military troop contingents on territory not covered by a 
65. A similar view is held by Roxstrom, Erik, Mark Gibney and Terje Einarsen, «The NATO 
bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights 
Protection», Boston University International Law Journal, (23) 2005 pp. 55–136, p. 97. 
Seemingly of the same view Tomuchat 1988 p. 129.
66. Loizidou v. Turkey, Appl. No. 15318/89, 23 March 1995, Decision as to the admissibility, §§ 88 
(italics by author).
67. Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 182.
68. Ibid., pp. 182 and 188.
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declaration, these presumably belong to the Member State itself and do not con-
stitute a part of the local administration, although questions may arise in relation 
to inter alia Home Guard detachments. Admittedly, such troops may be double-
hatted, serving both as Member State armed forces and local police. In such cases 
responsibility under the Convention would probably depend on which role they 
were exercising in the case under consideration. Thus, if such troops detain per-
sons during a period of political turmoil, an issue under the Convention may very 
well arise. The same would be the case with agents of the Member State sent to 
the territory to apprehend a person and bring him to the metropolitan territory.
This may amount to slipping jurisdiction under Article 1 through the back 
door into territory which is not covered by a declaration under Article 56, but 
this approach is fully in conformity with the case law of the Court. To avoid such 
responsibility the said State might admittedly be encouraged to redefine more 
of its officials as local administration, which in relation to empowering such ter-
ritories for independence might nevertheless not be such a bad idea. As regards 
military forces, these will probably be immune to such transformation for reasons 
of integrated command and control, and the need to maximize military strength 
during a period of reduced defense budgets. Exceptions may nevertheless arise for 
troops dedicated to upholding law and order, typically military police and Home 
Guard units.
4.2 The possibility of extending the Convention to Norwegian 
dependencies in the South Atlantic and Antarctica
Current examples of territories not covered by relevant declarations are the British 
Antarctic Territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory and Pitcairn Island – the 
latter also held by the United Kingdom.69 The same would be the case with the 
Norwegian territories Bouvet Island, Peter I Island and Queen Maud Land.
69. Moor and Simpson 2005 pp. 140 and 154–5. For a listing of which territories are cov-
ered, see the declarations mentioned at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=15/03/2012&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last visited 
September 6, 2012). Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 188 nevertheless find that these territories 
are covered by Art. 1, probably due to the territories having been created after the negotiations 
of the Convention. As regards the South Georgia and Southern Sandwich Islands, the Court 
found them covered by the Art. 56 regime in Quark Fishing Ltd v. the United Kingdom, App. 
No. 15305/06, 19 September 2006, Decision as to the admissibility. In relation to Pitcairn, it 
would still seem as if it has not been covered by an Art. 56 declaration, although The Pitcairn 
Constitution Order 2010 Sec. 25 (13) and (15) requires its courts to interpret a catalog of rights 
and freedoms in accordance with the Court’s jurisprudence, see http://www.government.pn/
Pitcairn%20Islands%20Constitution%20Order%202010.pdf (last visited September 6, 2010).
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It will be for Norwegian legislation to establish whether the dependencies 
of Bouvet Island, Peter I Island and Queen Maud Land constitute parts of the 
Kingdom of Norway proper, or if they are rather to be seen as territories for whose 
international relations Norway is responsible. Domestic law currently defines 
them as dependencies (‘biland’),70 and hence they do not constitute ‘parts’ of the 
Kingdom of Norway as that term is understood under Article 1 of the Norwegian 
Constitution of 1814.71 They are nevertheless seen as falling under Norwegian 
sovereignty and would as such seem to fit the category of territories able to be cov-
ered by Article 56 declarations. Alas, these dependencies have not been included 
in Section 5 of the 1999 Human Rights Act which makes e.g. the Convention ap-
plicable to Svalbard and Jan Mayen.72
Taking into consideration the size of current Norwegian operations in 
Antarctica, there is probably little reason for Norway to issue a declaration under 
Article 56 in relation to these areas. However, should Norway decide to establish 
more permanent all-year research stations in these dependencies than just Troll 
(located on Queen Maud Land) or expand the current one, it might be fitting to 
symbolize the importance of the Convention by making it applicable to the rel-
evant dependency.
Such an extension is of lesser importance to the acts or omissions of Norwegian 
public servants present there, as these would be capable of establishing extrater-
ritorial responsibility under Article 1 when they act in their public capacity. The 
said declaration would on the other hand ensure that acts or omission of private 
individuals – like scientists not working for the Norwegian government although 
70. Act of 17 February 1930 regarding the Bouvet Island, Peter I Island and Queen Maud Land, etc.
71. See: e.g. Castberg, Frede, Norges statsforfatning (I), 3. ed., Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1963 p. 
152, Andenæs, Johs. and Arne Fliflet, Statsforfatningen i Norge, 10. ed., Universitetsforlaget, 
2006 pp. 109–10, and Fliflet, Arne, Kongeriket Norges Grunnlov: Grunnloven med kommen-
tarer, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 2005 p. 50.
72. Admittedly, Sec. 2 of the Act of 17 February 1930 regarding the Bouvet Island, Peter I Island 
and Queen Maud Land, etc. makes Norwegian penal law applicable to these territories. As 
Sec. 1 § 2 of the General Civil Penal Act of 22 May 1902 modifies the reach of that penal act 
by Norwegian obligations under treaty and customary international law, this might give the 
impression that the Convention is applicable to these territories, too. However, due to the 
non-issuing of a declaration under Art. 56, the Convention is not per se applicable to those 
areas. Also, the explicit application of the Human Rights Act to Svalbard and Jan Mayen, 
whereas no reference is made to the territories at issue here (‘biland’), would seem to create a 
lex specialis regulation of the reach of the Convention in Norwegian law for the hypothetical 
situation that it would otherwise have applied through Sec. 1 § 2 of the General Civil Penal 
Act of 22 May 1902.
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their research might be financed largely by that government – could be covered 
by Norway’s positive obligations under the Convention.73
Nevertheless, issuing such a declaration for e.g. Queen Maud Land is not with-
out its problems, as Norway’s positive obligations would to a lesser or larger extent 
establish responsibility for violations of the Convention undertaken by personnel 
from the multiple foreign research bases found on that territory, whereas there is 
little Norwegian enforcement capability in the territory. Moreover, the jurisdic-
tional immunity granted some categories of personnel under the 1959 Antarctic 
Treaty Article VIII74 would have to be taken into consideration during discussions 
on the establishment of responsibility for Norway.
Be that as it may, should a permanent population of more than a minimum size 
manifest itself at some later stage, due to e.g. a lifting of the current ban on ex-
ploiting minerals other than for scientific research,75 it is submitted that Norway 
should accept the challenges which come with the issuing of a relevant declara-
tion; it should be politically unacceptable to leave a non-negligible group of such 
people outside the protection of the Convention, whereas it would be unrealistic 
to define the whole population as Norwegian public servants on duty 24/7 in order 
to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1.
5. Conclusions
Moor and Simpson concluded in 2006 that «[t]he jurisprudence, meagre as it is, 
wholly fails to address the way in which the world in which Article 56 operates to-
day has changed since the 1950s, and this notwithstanding the fact that the concep-
tion of the Convention as a living instrument, [is] to be interpreted in the light of 
73. Positive obligations are now recognized under probably all provisions of the Convention, see 
White and Ovey 2010 p. 100.
74. Art. VIII (1) reads as follows: «In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the 
present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties 
relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under para-
graph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph 1(b) of Article 
III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject 
only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of all 
acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their 
functions.»
75. See the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 30 ILM (1991) 
1455, Art. 7.
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present-day conditions…».76 The Court nevertheless upholds the regime of Article 
56, finding that it is not empowered to rewrite the Convention. However, this view 
holds few obstacles to establishing responsibility under the Convention for public 
servants acting abroad through the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Here it would seem like the more open formulation of Article 1 has provided 
fertile ground for a rather expanding notion of jurisdiction – although not as 
radical an expansion as has been the case with the development of many of the 
substantive provisions of the Convention under the living instrument approach. 
As regards Article 56, its very wording represents an obstacle to a similar human 
rights friendly development. This might be regretted, but it does provide a certain 
degree of predictability to governments, at the same time as it provides an avenue 
for these governments to expand the reach of the Convention in cooperation with 
local populations.
In relation to acts or omissions of the local administration of territories which 
may be covered by declarations under Article 56, it should be stressed that there are 
currently merely a few territories for whose international relations Member States 
are responsible without there also existing relevant declarations under Article 56.
The issue is nevertheless of importance to the admittedly small populations of 
the candidates to such declarations, and the size of the relevant populations may 
increase over the years. Moreover, Member States occasionally avoid, fully or par-
tially, the application to their abovementioned territories of some of the additional 
protocols to the Convention which have nevertheless been made binding on their 
metropolitan areas. The expansion of the geographical reach of such protocols may 
thus be of importance. Furthermore, not every declaration under Article 56 would 
seem to constitute a permanent commitment, and non-permanent declarations 
may be revoked.77 Under the current regulation, even non-temporary declara-
tion may actually be revoked through the mechanism in Article 58 paragraph 4 
for denouncing the Convention in relation to territories covered by declarations 
under Article 56. Lastly, should satellite photography and surveillance finally lo-
cate the lost islands of some of the Member States, like the Norwegian Schjetnan’s 
76. Moor and Simpson 2005 p. 183. On ibid., pp. 183–92 they also show how the Court could 
argue in order to largely interpret away the limitations provided by Art. 56 on the reach of 
human rights protection. The Court has not acted upon this suggestion.
77. For a list of such declarations, see http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=17/03/2012&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last visited 
September 6, 2012). As seen here, the United Kingdom has moved from using time-limited 
declarations to permanent ones. The most accessible overview of the territorial application 
of the Convention is nevertheless found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_scope_
of_European_Convention_on_Human_Rights (last visited September 6, 2012).
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Island (Schjetman Reef) in the Pacific Ocean, or the British Thompson Island in 
the Atlantic Ocean, and these claims be recognized by other States, the need may 
arise to further widening the geographical net of the Convention through the use 
of Article 56 should these territories at some later stage receive a non-negligible 
population.
Postscript
The Court dismissed the application in the Chagos Islanders v. the United 
Kingdom78 case on 11 December 2012. In general, the Court upholds its former 
case law on the issues covered by this note. It thus supports the view that the United 
Kingdom’s total control of the territory does not as such make that territory part 
of metropolitan United Kingdom,79 whereas the fact that decisions regarding the 
territory is made by politicians and officials within the United Kingdom «is not 
considered a sufficient ground on which to base competence under the Convention 
for an area otherwise outside Convention space.»80 However, the Court addresses 
the relationship between Article 1 and Article 56 in an unsatisfying way. Referring 
to the Al-Skeini case where the Court held that Article 56 paragraph 1 «cannot be 
interpreted in present conditions as limiting the scope of the term «jurisdiction» 
in Article 1»,81 the Court addresses whether that passage «must now be considered 
to be alternative bases of jurisdiction which may apply even where a Contracting 
State has not extended application of the Convention to the overseas territory in 
issue, namely, that the United Kingdom can be held responsible for its acts and 
omissions in relation to the Chagos Islands, despite its exercise of its choice not to 
make a declaration under Article 56, if it nonetheless exercised «State agent author-
ity and control» or «effective control» in the sense covered by the Grand Chamber 
judgment.»82 It comes as no surprise that «[t]his interpretation is strongly rejected 
by the respondent Government»,83 but it is difficult to agree with the Court’s view 
that such an interpretation «would indeed render Article 56 largely purposeless 
and devoid of content since Contracting States generally did, and do, exercise au-
78. Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35622/04, 11 December 2012, Decision as 
to the admissibility.
79. Ibid., § 64.
80. Ibid., § 65.
81. Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, Judgment (Grand 
Chamber), § 140.
82. Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35622/04, 11 December 2012, Decision as 
to the admissibility, § 75.
83. Ibid.
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thority and control over their overseas territories.»84 In such settings a Member 
State will admittedly retain some degree of control over the local administration, 
but as shown above it is possible to differentiate that power from the more direct 
«authority and control» over an individual or the «effective control» over an area 
as those grounds for establishing jurisdiction have been understood in the Court’s 
previous case law. Be that as it may, the weight of the Court’s view is reduced by 
the fact that it finds it unnecessary to rule on this particular issue85 (since the ap-
plicants were inter alia considered not to have retained their status as victims). 
Also, the decision was given by a chamber and was not unanimous, although it 
is not known how large the minority was nor on which issues its views differed 
from that of the majority.
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Резюме
Статья 56 Европейской конвенции по правам человека часто упоминается 
как “колониальный пункт”, со стороны комментаторов ей уделяется мало 
внимания, в то время как Статье 1, которая касается экстерриториальной 
досягаемости, посвящены обширные иследования. Статья 56 обладает, од-
нако, эффектом ограничения ответственности государств-участников за 
свои действия и упущения административных органов на принадлежащим 
им территориям, хотя государство-участник все еще несет на себе ответ-
ственность, при непосредственном участии государственных служащих, 
работающих на таких территориях. В нижеприведенной статье, автор, при-
84. Ibid. The Court admittedly states in the next paragraph that «…even accepting the above in-
terpretation, the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on this particular argument…». It would 
seem as if the «above interpretation» refers to that of the applicants, but the sentence – argu-
ably – merely shows that even if the applicants’ view was correct, it would nevertheless not 
have influenced the outcome of the case. This is different from the Court adopting the ap-
plicants’ view as its own. The Court’s own view on this issue is thus found in para. 75.
85. Ibid., § 76. A similar approach is taken to the question whether an express denunciation is 
required before a territory formerly covered by a declaration is redefined into a different ter-
ritory for whose international relations the Member State continues to be responsible, see 
ibid., § 62.
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водя для примера Норвегию, считает ненужным для этой страны брать 
обязательства в соответствии со Статьей 56, в отношении ее территорий в 
Антарктиде, и прилежащим к ней землям, так как ведущаяся здесь деятель-
ность в настоящее время довольно незначительна, и уже входит в экстерри-
ториальный режим Статьи 1. Далее в статье рассматриваются доводы за и 
против распространения действия конвенции на территории, подпадающие 
под Статью 56, если дальнейшее развитие приведет к возникновению более 
многочисленного и постоянного населения на этих территориях. 
Ключевые слова: Европейская конвенция по правам человека, экстерри-
ториальность, зависимость, Южная Атлантика, Антарктида
